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3OTERNATI0NAL CARTELS 
International cartels w i l l be a major factor i n the forthcoming 
peace. Everyone interested i n economics i s wondering just how far the 
governments of the Allied countries w i l l push government cartels, such 
as those that existed before the war i n rubber and o i l . 
Before I discuss the past and future indications of cartels I 
would like to give a definition of the term. A "cartel" i s defined by 
the League of Nations as "an association of independent undertakings 
towards improving conditions of production and sales". This i s an 
adequate definition, but to this we may ask, "Who profits by these 
inprovements?" To this the answer i s obvious. We know that one of 
the objects of the cartel i s to rest r i c t competition. I t i s through 
contpetition that the public receives better and lower cost products, 
so restriction of competition does the common consumer no good."^  
Cartels not only make closed markets of competitors here in the 
Ikiited States, but they keep out foreign competition. They assume and 
exercise power that should be trusted only to the governments. By 
making agreements not to trade i n certain areas and to exclude foreign 
competition from this country, they can n u l l i f y t a r i f f policies. Car-
tel s can and do defeat governmental efforts to promote foreign trade. 
While our o f f i c i a l representatives abroad seek to promote the exchange 
of goods, secret private agreements between cartels decide that this 
2 
exchange shall not take place, 
A government controls cartels by arrangements under the direction 
or with the sanction of the government having jurisdiction over such 
enterprises and i t usually contains provisions for the enforcement of 
the arrangement. 
1. J . Howard Pew, Cartels Threatening Economic Progress, (Boston, 19U0), pg. 106 
2. Howard S. Curry, Cartels of the World, (New York, 1939), Pg. 1^ 2 
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According to Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General of the 
United States, "Cartels can only operate efficiently i n the inter-
national realm i f they exist under a system of national monopolies 
or monopoly groups i n industry,^ 
As cartels grow more and more powerful, these international 
monopolies tend to assxime the role of government. Then one of two 
things can happen. Either the government lets tham alone and they 
become the goverament on t a r i f f problems, or the government keeps an 
active control on the cartels so they can't become too powerful. 
As a background for further discussion, i t seems best to give 
a review of cartels i n our history. The struggle against monopolies 
began vd-th the American Revolution, which i n i t s economic aspects was 
a revolt against monopoly, and continued intermittently duiing the 17th 
century. Primarily, our early efforts to keep the market free were 
carried on by the states themselves. The develoisment of the frontier 
and the settlement of the West often obsctired the effects of monopoly 
and thereby diverted attention from the need to combat i t . As long as 
opportunity could always be found i n the opening up of new areas, i t 
was d i f f i c u l t for monopoly to fasten i t s grip upon the economy. When 
the geographic frontier closed, however, i t became evident that the 
continued concentration of economic power threatened to eclipse enter-
prise. Consequently, during the la s t year of the 19th century there 
arose a mighty fight against the trusts which resulted i n the passage 
of the Sherman Act. The Sheman Act i s the expression of a fundamental 
opposition to the domination of industry by monopoly groups and to the 
control of opportunity by economic privilege. Nevertheless, we know-
that the trend to concentration i n industiy and the increase of econo-
mic power i n the hands of pri-vileged groups continued despite the ef-
forts of government and the opposition of the majority of the people. 
3. Wendell Berge, Cartels and American Economic Li f e , (Boston, 19ii5), pg. 13 
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During the years from 192h to 1918 the process of the monopoliza-
tion of economic l i f e was abetted by the conditions and demands of a 
war economy. In the return to normalcy, efforts to re s t r i c t monopoly 
power were further relaxed, and i n the boom era of the 20's there was 
l i t t l e concern with the monopoly problem. The enforcement of the Sher-
man Act was more nominal than re a l . Size became a symbol of efficiency 
in industry. The formation of mergers and combines, the development of 
of patent pools and the elimination of small scale enterprises were 
accepted almost as a part of the nature of things. Both i n the United 
States and throughout the world cartels were able to entrench themselves 
because there was l i t t l e xmderstanding of their effects. During this 
period the cartelization of world industry reached a peak. Monopoly 
had become international i n scope. In many aspects, therefore, the 
cartel problem which has plagued us during the present war i s a heritage 
from the 20's. In large part, the great depression was the result of 
cartels being able to impose a policy of restricted output and high 
price,^ 
In this mirror of recent history we can see clearly the sequence 
of errors which frustrated victory i n 1918, making the Armistice an 
interval and i n the end destroying peace once more. By f a i l i n g to 
come to grips with the fuaadamental maladjustments i n the world economy 
at that time, or to displace an economic philosophy of restriction by 
progressive collaboration toward equity and freedom i n trade, the 
Allies i n 1918 forfeited their chance to revamp and to liberate the 
world market, 1^ substituting p o l i t i c a l formulae for economic solu-
tions, they sought to evade the problems of an industrial society on 
a quandary. As a consequence, the major powers reverted to a system 
•vriiich seems to me a l i t t l e l i k e the Middle Ages, with economic moats 
and walls i n the form of exclusion t a r i f f s and quotas blocking the 
k, Wendell Berge, 'l?hat Substitute for Private International Cartels, 
(lifashington, 19h5^, pg. U — -
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channels of exchange. 
In an address to the Washington Club i n January, 19ii5, Wendell 
Berge stated, "There i s undoubtedly a movement on foot to persuade us 
that we must keep cartels and t i y to eliminate their bad features - as 
i f there would be aiything l e f t of them i f this could be done. This 
movement to save cartels has as i t s immediate objective giving cartel 
arrangements immunity from prosecution under the anti-tnist laws. I t s 
strategy has already become clear and has been indicated by testimony of 
cartel spokesmen before 6enate Committees, i n proposals to amend the 
anti-trust laws circulated by certain business groups, and i n writings 
of certain persons whose names give a covering of liberalism to the 
proposals",^ 
Milo Perkins, former Executive Director of the Economic Warfare 
Board, once wrote, "Where we cannot eliminate cartels, we must gradually 
perfect ways to make them into instruments which serve the public inter-
est." But at the beginning of the a r t i c l e , emphasized by i t a l i c type, 
Mr, Perkins stated, " A l l cartels are i n business to keep prices at levels 
which could not be kept i f free competition existed". In other words, 
Mr, Perkins i n one breath asserts that cartels are devices for fooling 
the public, and i n the next breath asserts that such devices can be 
made to serve the public interest,^ 
I t i s believed by these men that we must have cartels i f we want to 
compete i n international trade with foreign countries who have cartels. 
Although i t i s possible to separate our domestic scene from the 
international picture, i t must be kept i n mind that i n practice the 
two phases of our economic l i f e are inseparably blended and mutually 
conditioned. Thus, i n attaining high levels of employment, production, 
and national income we cannot neglect the stimulation of international trade, 
5. Wendell Berge, The Challenge of Cartels. (Washington, 19U5) 
6, J , Howard Pew, pg, 112 
_ ^ _ 
In either the domestic or international f i e l d , when a cartel exists 
the following results occvir: 
1, They seek to consolidate industrial power 
•by destroying existing independent enter-
prise, 
2, They prevent new enterprises from entering 
the f i e l d , 
3« Having accomplished these objectives, they 
res t r i c t production and raise prices, 
U, They stop the introduction of new and more 
efficient methods i n order to maintain ab-
solute ways of production i n the continu-
ance of which they have a vested interest. 
They set up arbitrary and despotic control 
over production and exploit weaker members 
of their own group, 
6, They enter politics using money and economic 
coersion, making alliances with other power-
f u l groups against the interests of consumers 
and independent producers, 
7, They form their own protective t a r i f f s and „ 
make foreign economic policies for the nation,' 
The economic theory on which cartels operate i s the doctrine of 
scarcity for the ma^ y and privilege for the few. Cartels believe i n 
unlimited authority for themselves, but oppose opportunity for new 
enterprise. They fear competition and they fear change. They employ 
every recourse to destroy freedom of the market and they exert a l l 
possible means to control or to suppress technological development. 
No amount of earnest desire on the part of publicly constituted 
authority to foster international cooperation and to raise standards 
of liv i n g through trade can be successful i f cartels are permitted to 
divide and rule basic world industries. 
7, Thurman W, Arnold, Cartels or Free Bntterprise?, pg, 103 
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The German Cartel 
We have now come to recognize that long before Germany launched 
i t s campaign for world domination, German industry, operating through 
cartels and playing upon the fears of industrialists i n other countries, 
had l a i d the foundations for aggression. By ruthless and hidden measures 
of economic warfare, by secret agreements which restricted the production 
of v i t a l materials, Germany's cartel system had achieved economic con-
quests which were stepping stones i n the direction of ultimate military 
domination. To monopoly-minded business men i n the Ifaited States and 
Great Britain cartel agreements made with German industries were devices 
for achieving economic st a b i l i t y , eliminating con^jetition, and safe-
guarding an entrenched position. Monopolies which desired to eliminate 
a l l competition i n domestic markets were susceptible to offers of a 
protected market at home even though i t meant giving up a l l or part of 
their shares i n world trade. As a consequence, whole continents were 
handed over to German industry to be exploited economically and i n -
f i l t r a t e d p o l i t i c a l l y . New industries which threatened existing 
investment were throttled and v i t a l sectors of economic development 
were not permitted to grow. To German industry cartel agreements 
were a method by which the markets of the world could be divided and 
by which the German nation could hope for a decisive superiority i n 
the sinews of war. 
There are definite indications that some outstanding industries 
in European countries have joined German cartels, which, i n the event 
that Germany had won the war, would have become Continental European 
Cartels, The scope of these cartels ranged from iron and steel a l l 
the way down to zippers. 
In order to evaluate the significance and implications of this 
expanded German cartelization policy, i t i s essential to take into 
consideration the changes that have taken place i n the position of 
- 7 -
the German cartels under the National Socialist regime. 
Under conditions of relatively free competition, the German cartels 
•were allowed to perform their chief function of elementing or regulating 
ccanpetition with comparatively l i t t l e interference from the government. 
The cartels were recognized as an integral part of the economic structure 
of the country and much weight was attached hy the government to the 
claim of the chief exponents of cartelization that, vinder modem conditions 
of capital investments and high fixed costs, a cotintry l i k e Germany coiad 
not afford to subject i t s important industries to the wide price fluctua-
tions that would take place -without the stabilizing influence of the cartel. 
The legal restraints on cartels interfered very l i t t l e -with their 
activity and were merely aimed at abuses. Far from being opposed to car-
telization, the German government on a number of occasions, long before 
the comprehensive compulsory carteli^^ation law of July 15, 1933> intervened 
to compel industries to renew a cartel agreement. The Cartel Ordinance of 
1923, which also established the cartel court, merely placed cartels on a 
more formal basis and gave the government power of dissolution i n cases 
where cartels were found "to be detrimental to public interest", though 
restriction of economic freedom by the Cartel Court was confined largely 
to dealing -with cases between the cartels and their members who desired 
to withdraw or had actually withdrawn or refused to comply with the cartel 
regulations. 
The cartel decree of July 26, 1930, represents a more direct attack 
on the cartel price poli<y, and was based on the assumption that the 
cartels were responsible for the fail\ire of the price level to adjust 
i t s e l f to the reduced purchasing power of the country. This decree gave 
the government the power to invalidate price-fixing agreements yrhen they 
operated to the prejudice of production or distribution or interfered 
with economic freedom to a degree that could not be j u s t i f i e d economically. 
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The enforcement of the new decree was placed in the hands of the Minister 
of National Econ<m?y, who could act without the intervention of the Cartel 
Cotirt,® 
Despite the sporadic intervention of the government i n cartel matters 
and the potential regulating power of the State, i t may be said that prior 
to the advent of the National Socialist regime, the German cartel was p r i -
marily an organization for carrying out the economic policies of private 
interests. 
The fundamental econOTiic policies of the National Socialist regime, 
directed toward State control of the national economy, economic stabiliza-
tion and f u l l utilization of the productive resources, were i n conflict 
with some of the essential functions of the cartels and f i n a l l y succeeded 
in understanding the whole cartel structure as a private institution. 
Theoretically, the compulsory cartelization law of Jtily 15, 1933, 
which the Minister of National Economy was given the power to compel i n -
dividual producers to join an existing cartel, strengthened the position 
of the German cartel by making i t possible for the cartelized part of an 
industry to obtain assistance of the government i n getting i*id of the 
troublesome outsider. 
One of the provisions gave the Ministry of National Economy the power 
to r e s t r i c t the expansion of utilization of industrial f a c i l i t i e s i n the 
interest of the branch of production involved, and with due regard to 
public welfare. This power gave the government the means for regulating 
production, which was formerly exercised by the cartels and other forms 
of economic concentration. Another provision made more definite the 
powers of the Minister of National Economy to dissolve cartels or cartel 
provisions without, recourse to the Cartel Court, 
By introducing comprehensive price control, rationing of raw mater-
i a l s and other supplies, controlling foreign trade, foreign exchange, and 
8, Louis Domeratsky, German Cartels - Their Evolution Itader War Conditions, 
(Washington, 19l3), pg. 1 ~~~ 
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the capital market, and extending the f i e l d of direct government p a r t i c i -
pation i n industry, the government deprived the cartels of mai^ y of their 
essential functions and of a considerable part of their influence. 
The German cartel was due for a change which would have taken place, 
probably i n a more evolutionary form, without the advent of the Nazi regime. 
Considering the German p o l i t i c a l psychology and economic background, i t i s 
safe to assume that the solution would have been found along the line of 
greater intervention on the part of the State, The fact that the Weimar 
Republic was not sufficiently strong, or perhaps was incapable of using 
i t s p o l i t i c a l strength to intervene effectively i n the cartel situation, 
does not necessarily mean that effective State intervention could have been 
held off indefinitely,^ 
The Nazi regime, with rearmament as the central objective, approached 
the cartel problem from the standpoint of the organization of the national 
economy for the greatest impact of the csirtel on the constaner. To the new 
government, the cartel and other forms of economic concentration appealed 
as instruments to be utilized as extensions of the government's power to 
control the national economy for the new p o l i t i c a l objective. In the 
process of becoming such an Instrument, the cartel soon lost i t s capacity 
for influencing the market for the benefit of the participating producers 
or distributors, but also most of i t s functions connected with the control 
of supply. This happened because the State, i n i t s efforts to gain con-
t r o l over the economy, took over, one by one, the functions of controlling 
prices, supplies, foreign trade, wages, interest rates, capital market, and 
direction of investments,^^ 
The cartels, instead of limiting production and controlling prices, 
were ordered to help i n u t i l i s i n g the f u l l production capacity of i t s 
membership by converting, i f they involved essential industries, or by 
9, Louis Domeratsky, German Cartels - Their Evolution Under War Conditions, 
(Washington, 19h3), pgT^ 
10, "New German Cartel Policy", November 1, 1933 
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curtailing or even closing down plants i f they produced non-essential 
consumer goods. A cartel, the chief function of which i s to regulate 
production so as to prevent bothersome competition, cannot find any 
legitimate reason for existence when the demand far outstrips supplies 
and when the production f a c i l i t i e s are strained to the utmost under the 
watchful eye of a totalitarian state. Tinder those circumstances a i ^ at-
tempt on the part of a cartel to carry out i t s traditional policy would 
be regarded by the Nazi govenament as treasonable and severely punishable. 
In addition to losing practically a l l i t s economic functions under 
the war economy, the German cartel has been put under such rigid control 
that i t has lost practically a l l freedom of action. The price control, 
as mentioned above, has been taken away by the Government Price Commissioner, 
Ever since 1931+ a l l existing price control arrangements of cartels have 
been subject to the approval of the Minister of National Econony, The 
cartel has been deprived of the right to f i x quotas or divide up t e r r i -
tories and markets,"^"^ 
TJnder the Gemeinschaftswerke Law of September kf 1939t industrial 
organizations can be created that can compel their manbers to expand or 
close down, to apply certain processes of production, and the l i k e . 
By the decree of October 20, 191+2, the powers of the Minister of 
National Economy over a l l forms of marketing organization were extended 
to include any organization or part thereof that may influence the market, 
Tftider this decree the Minister of National Economy can make the formation 
of any such organization subject to his approval, can dissolve, or combine 
existing organizations, can forbid the managers and other officers to en- • 
gage in activities connected with marketing organizations and can change 
the regulations governing them. President Kehrl (in charge of Reich-
svereinigungen) announced that of the twenty-two thousand cartels only 
about five hundred were l i k e l y to survive. I t should be pointed out, 
11, "Price Control i n Germany - Policy and Technique", April 19l+i+ 
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however, that in view of the great concentration in German industry 
the new organizations i ^ i c h are replacing the cartel do not necessarily 
involve a change i n personal power, Maiqr of the big business men i n lead-
ing industrial organizations prior to the outbreak of the war, or even be-
fore the advent of the Nazi regime, are s t i l l i n prominent positions in 
12 
the present alignment, 
While the cartel has not entirely disappeared, despite the loss of i t s 
main functions and the very considerable decrease in nunibers, new forms of 
organization, better adapted to the new circumstances, have come into ex-
istence. The outstanding feature of the new organization i s i t s variety 
and frequent regrouping, which would seem to indicate i t s more or less 
experimental character and perhaps also the strain under which the German 
economic planners are now working. 
While the f u l l extent of the activity of the German cartels in con-
solidating the industries of the occupied and dominated countries cannot 
be ascertained for obvious reasons, i t i s quite evident from what has a l -
ready been announced that the work i s proceeding at a rapid rate. In this 
connection i t should be pointed out that i n some of the annexed terr i t o r i e s , 
especially i n the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia to which the compulsory 
cartel law was extended at the beginning of 191+0, a good deal of the work 
of consolidating the local with the corresponding German industries has 
been accomplished by the acquisition of financial control. 
In estimating the progress of the German cartelization drive i n the 
occupied co+intries, allowance should be made for the incompleteness of the 
information available. Taking into consideration the conditions under 
which the centralization policy has been carried on, i t i s safe to state 
the German cartel, as modified under the National Socialist regime, played 
an important part i n the building up of the Continental European economic 
bloc, which was the avowed aim of the National Socialist government of Germai^, 
12, Louis Dcaneratsky, The. German Cartel as an Instnament of Economic Control 
of the European Continent, ^.Washington, 191+1 J , pg. T 
13, Ibid, pg, 
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CARTELS IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
One of the chief sources of friction.between the Tftiited States and 
Great M*itain has been plans restricting production i n the interests of 
producers. Many of these plans have governmental support. Some countries 
play parts of a producer and others play parts of a consumer. Then the 
question becomes one of monopolistic restriction. 
The Itaited States i s interested i n restoring free trade and free 
ccanpetition and that's the way our legislation tends to lead. Great 
Britain, on the other hand, tends to go i n the opposite direction. One 
reason i s that Britain's Labor Movement reached i t s strength before the 
United States' and the former took an active part i n politics with a 
Socialist point of view. Socialism holds that combination i n business 
i s inevitable under capitalism and the government's place i s to assume 
ownership and control i n the interest of the public. The Brit i s h see 
the evils of monopolies, but t h ^ don't l i k e competition, so they have 
complete or partial government ownership of industries, 
We a l l know something about the United Organization, but do we know 
anything about the other organizations of Nations provided by internation-
a l cartels? 
A cartel within the limits of the United States i s i l l e g a l , but i n a 
streamlined form i t now operates internationally, 
Gorwin D, Edwards, of the Department of Justice, prepared the follow-
ing classification for the Senate Military Affairs Committee. 
1. The Association - uses restriction of competition by means 
of a trade agreement. They adopt rules and regulations to 
f i x prices, limit or apportion output, allocate territory, 
redistribute profits according to a formula. This i s the 
most venerable kind of cartel, since unless i t s agreements 
1J+, George Saule, America's Stake i n Britain's Futtire, (New York, 19U5), 
pp. 169-172 
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are enforceable under the law, the members can break 
i t at a i ^ time. This type i s i l l e g a l i n the United 
States and i s more prevalent i n Europe. 
Patent-Licensing Agreement - Due to the rapid advances 
of manufacturing processes in the modem world, maixy 
important processes are patented. When the basic 
patents are about to run out, an improvement, real or 
a r t i f i c i a l , i s invented for the purpose-of retaining 
control. Agreements between patent holders are made 
up so that patents may be shared and s t i l l keep a con-
t r o l on prices and output. For instance, Mr, Edwards 
points out that before the war "there were comprehm-
sive patents and processes agreements between duPont 
and Imperial Chemical Industries (of Great Britain) 
and between I , G, Farbenindustrie and Standard Oil Comp-
any of New Jersey, There was a gentleman's agreement 
between duPont and I , G, Farbenindustrie by which each 
was to get from the other f i r s t option on new processes 
and products not alreac^ promised to a third party. There 
was apparently a comprehensive working agreement and cer-
tainly a series of working arrangements as to specific 
products between Imperial Chemical Industries and I , G» 
Farbenindustrie, Around this central pattern were grouped 
various lesser alliances among other companies, and many 
special agreements among manufact\irers of dyestuffs, plastics, 
explosives and other chemical products". 
According to Mr, Edwards, "Two of the largest companies 
i n the United States, which we think of as separate, were 
linked iwith the chemical monopoly i n England and with the 
- 13 -
chemical monopoly i n Germaixy - and so -with each other. 
This gigantic monopoly parceled out the world market 
among the companies involved. 
3. The Combine - This i s a form of control through cor-
porate ownership and contracts of varied kinds. I t 
i s sometimes more intricate and d i f f i c u l t to trace than 
even the licensing agreements. Often the two are com-
bined, as where corporations that have exchanged patents 
ovm subsidiaries i n common,^ ^ 
One can cite the cartels that are held together by specific govemmentsLL 
support, or by international commodity agreements, like the rubber cartel. 
Before the war, the,chief source of natural rubber, of which the 
l&iited States was the greatest consumer, was i n British Malaya and the 
Dutch East Indies, Soon after the F i r s t World War, the Brit i s h interests 
attempted to increase prices ty restricting output through the Stevenson 
Plan, which passed the British legislat\ire. The government's interest was 
not simply to push the commercial fortunes of the private owners, but also 
to help remedy the weakness i n sterling exchange by extracting more silver 
dollars from American p+irchases. The plan was successful for a while i n 
spite of American opposition, but eventually broke down because of the 
competition from rubber-growing regions that were not included i n i t . I t 
was succeeded i n the early depression years l y "the International Rubber 
Regulating Committee, which included the United Kingdom, India, Siam, 
France and the Netherlands, This also rested on support by the govern-
ments concerned,•'•^  
Now the United States has equipment for tiiming out synthetic rubber 
capable of f u l f i l l i n g i t s normal needs. I f costs can be brought low 
enough, we shall not have to buy much from the former producers unless 
15, -Ibid, pg, 175 
16, Ibid, pg, 150 
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we wish to do so. But what, i n that case, would happen not caily to the 
Bri t i s h , Dutch, and other business interests concerned, but to the natives 
engaged i n rubber production, the purchasing power of the international 
balance of payments? The American interests might join the international 
cartel but then what would happen to the rubber consumers? Obviously, 
there i s need for an international rubber agreement i n which consumers 
w i l l be adequately represented. 
Tin,' nickel, and other raw materials present similar problems. Com-
plex as each of these problems i s , no satisfactory solution of any one of 
them can be achieved i f each i s regarded as existing in a water tight com-
partment. In some cases a given nature i s a consumer, i n others i t s chief 
interest may be that of a producer. 
The importance of any plan for governing the activities of men i s 
partly dependent on i t s extent. Geographically, cartels cover the whole 
world. Not every one includes every country, for there are some circum-
stances which necessitate omissions. For instance, i t i s useless to t r y 
to exercise the power of an international monopoly i n a country where the 
domestic business in question i s not subject to monopoly i n one way or 
17 
another. 
Cartels are important also in their extent over industries and pro-
ducts. Any natural product of mining or agriculture, the ownership of 
which can be concentrated, i s subject to monopoly. Any process of man-
ufacture or any fabricated product Tdiich can be held under patents can be 
monopolized. The degree of monopoly conferred by the necessity of heavy 
investments to enter an industry, as i n steel, permits cartelization, and 
even though the industry which directly makes the product we buy i s com-
petitive, the chances are 99 i n 100 that i t s costs contain a tribute to 
the cartel empire. Farmers con5)ete with one another except insofar as the 
17, Wendell Berge, Challenge of Cartels, pg, 3 
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farm bloc i n Congress holds up minimum prices, but farmers have to buy 
cartelized f e r t i l i z e r , agricultural equipment, and many other things that 
must be had to run a farm,^^ 
There i s probably no more competitive industry in the United States 
than those which make textiles and clothing, but they have to buy cartel-
ized dyes and other chemicals, and they need their share of rubber and 
other general necessities out of which cartels make their profit and 
build their power, not to mention patent-controlled rayon and rxylon. 
How can we be sure that the rest of the world i s irrevocable committ-
ed to the cartel system? Who do we mean by the rest of the world? Do we 
mean China and South America? Do we mean Canada, Australia and the far-
flung dominions and colonies of the British BBsplre, or do we just mean Europe? 
I f we just mean Europe, who do we mean i n Europe? Do we mean the democratic 
forces, the underground movements of continental Europe? Certainly not. 
There i s certainly no evidence that the democratic forces i n the other oc-
cupied countries desire a retvim to the pre-war private cartel system. 
As for Geimany, before the war i t was one of the chief exponents of the 
cartel system. But stirely we are not going to list e n to the voices of the 
German cartelists again. Presumably, one of our principal objects i n seek-
ing total victory I s to get otirselves i n a position to destroy the aggressive 
industrial power of Germany and to provide effective measures to prevent the 
German industrialists from again threatening the peace of the world. I f we 
cannot find democratic forces i n Germany that we can support i n reconsti-
tuting Germany so that i t w i l l not again menace peace, we w i l l probably have 
to impose Allied rule on German industry for such length of time as i t i s 
necessary to stamp out the forces that produced the war. So there would seem 
to be no reason why we must li s t e n to the German industrialists, although i t 
has been rumored that some of them are already seeking to make their voices 
19 " 
heard and are receiving a friendly ear from some of our own industrialists, 
18. Thuman W, Arnold, Cartels or Free Enterprise?, pg, 5 
19, ?fendell Berge, What Substitute for Private International Cartels?, pg. 8 
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So continental Europe certainly i s not i n a position to compel us 
to bow to the cartel systan as an inevitability i n the modem world. 
As for the countries i n the Orient and i n South and Central America, 
?rith the exception of Japan, to which the same considerations apply as 
apply to Germar^, these countries never have been addicted to the cartel 
syst«a, although they have frequently been the victim of the cartels or-
ganized i n Europe and America, There i s no problem of having to appease 
our neighbors in the Orient or i n South and Central America, 
Sentiment i n Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and the B r i t i s h colonies 
i n South Africa seems to be largely anti-cartel, like i n the United States, 
there are individual differences of opinion i n the dominions and colonies of 
the Bri t i s h Iktrpire, but a careful perusal of available reports of sentiment 
as expressed i n current magazines, editorials and newspaper columns indicates 
that the sentiment in these parts of the world i s predominately anti-cartel. 
RESULTS OF CARTELS 
The principal reason for any monopolistic device i s to f i x prices 
higher than those which would be obtained without i t . • This fact i s some-
times masked by price reductions made by the cartels. The price reduction 
may result from lowering costs. I t may be the result of trying to elimin-
ate a competitor or to maintain sales i n competition wilih a different kind 
of product idiich i s not controlled. Of course, the cartel i s after the 
maximum profit and this may be best achieved by selling more products at a 
lower price. In a l l these cases the lower price i s a result of an adminis-
tration decision rather than from the impersonal forces of the market, and 
in most cases the resulting price i s higher than i f i t had been on the open 
market and subject to free competition. Cartels charge at least as much as 
the market w i l l bear. 
Consumers also suffer because of the lack of competition, i n that the 
absence of competition deprives the maker of aixy incentive to improve quality. 
Sometimes he actually reduces quality to get a larger volume of sales or to 
protect another product i n which he has an interest. For instance, Coiwin 
Edwards charges that General Electric reduced the l i f e of lamp bulbs and 
discouraged bulb testing by p\irchasers. The lamp mantifacturers have also 
been reluctant to introduce the much more economical and longer lived fluor-
escent lamps for household use. 
Similar to the lack of improvement or actual deterioration of products 
i s the s t i f l i n g lack of technological advance i n the matter of new products. 
An enormous amount of research i s being done by companies belonging to 
cartels. Another result of monopolies i s overproduction and underconsumption, 
an Tinbalanced exchange between organized industry which i s restricting pro-
duction, and farmers and small businessmen who are unable to res t r i c t pro-
duction. Farm prices f a l l and industrial prices r i s e . The farmer cannot 
buy enough to keep the factories running. Labor i s l a i d off, thus cutting 
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down buying power s t i l l further. Goods pile up because they cannot be 
distributed at the a r t i f i c i a l level set by the cartels. Thus we get 
overproduction of goods i n the face of actual need for them. 
Domestic cartels t r y also to control foreign markets so that the nation 
can get r i d of this so-called overproduction. At the f i r s t period of this 
growth of these international cartels, the ideal of free enterprise i s ex-
alted. Later, when i t becomes apparent that the market i s no longer free, 
a new p o l i t i c a l philosophy arises, justifying centralized planning of pro-
duction and distribution. 
The defenders of cartels i n s i s t that the alternative i s "cut-throat 
competition, progressive deterioration of agriculture, disastrous declines 
21 
i n prices, foreclosures of mortgages and ruin". This same idea lay behind 
the establishment of the N, R, A, i n 1933. At that time banks and financial 
institutions were f a i l i n g because of f a l l i n g prices. Today the danger of de-
flation i s gone. The war has created the danger of inflation. Therefore, the 
justification of delegating to private groups the power to strangle production 
at home and abroad today must rest on a different basis than the N, R, A, 
Many of the aforementioned problems w i l l not be solved at one stroke nor 
as quickly as we may wish, but there i s every reason for confidence that there 
are no insoluble situations, and no basic reasons why the f l e x i b i l i t y and 
adaptability of this country cannot cope with the conditions of peace as ably 
as with the necessities of war. Nor are there any conditions of such magni-
tude as to cause us to abandon the democratic concepts which have been af-
firmed and strengthened by events. On the contrary, we have every reason 
for expecting that the accomplishments ahead w i l l prove i n repeated per-
formance the principles upon which the national l i f e i s founded. 
After years of war, sacrifice, and t o i l dedicated to the maintenance 
of freedom among nations, the American people can now take up again the 
20, George Soule, America's Stake i n Britain's Futtire, pg, 175 
21, J , Anton De Haas, Economic Peace Through Private Agreements, (Winter, 19UU) 
pg. 22 
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ways of peacefta l i v i n g . I t i s characteristic of Americans always to feel 
that the future beckons. They recognize that the future may hold r i s k s , 
and that new economic problems w i l l demand new answers. 
I t seems clear that America can never have a foreign policy based on 
the principles of democracy and international goodwill as long as inter-
national trade i s dominated by cartels. I t does not seem possible that 
the Atlantic Charter, the Good Neither Policy, and the reciprocal trade 
pacts can effectively prevail i f the special privileges of cartels domin-
ate trade and politics i n the postwar world. 
In many respects cartels form one of the central issues of the present 
period. The greatest threat to our success i n achieving f u l l production and 
f+jll employment at home and friendly cooperation with other nations abroad 
i s the philosophy and practice of privilege embodied in cartels. I f there 
i s to be a free and productive economy i n the United States, or a free ex-
change of goods i n the world markets, the power of cartels must be broken. 
I t i s essential to understand that cartels are, i n effect, private 
economic governments which seek to divide and rule world industry on the 
basis of economic privilege. I f cartels are successful i n gaining a foot-
hold i n the postwar period, i t w i l l almost be impossible for this nation to 
maintain a high level of peacetime production or to cooperate i n the recon-
struction of world trade,-
The conduct of cartels i n the period before and during the war has been 
one of the tragic pages of otir history. The shortages of aluminum and magnes-
ium resulting from cartel restrictions forced us to strip the kitchens of 
America and scar our public squar es with scrap piles. The scarcity of rub-
ber i s a never-ending threat to our productive effort. Our armed forces 
plead with us to send them binoculars. The lack of v i t a l drugs and medicines 
has jeopardized our men fighting i n fever stricken areas. In fact, almost 
«-
wherever there was a cartel there was a shortage. 
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But cartels have an even more serious aspect. These private govern-
ments threaten the sovereignty of domestic nations. The p o l i t i c a l impli-
cations of cartel activity threaten to subvert future national public 
policy of the United States, 
There i s a close relation between a country's economic policies and 
i t s foreign relations. I t i s generally recognized now that economic free-
dom cannot be attained at home i f private groups are permitted to acquire 
monopoly power over industry. Likewise, i t must be equally recognized that 
friendship and cooperation between this country and other nations cannot 
be established without the free exchange of goods and services. Recipro-
cal trade treaties and good neighbor policies can have l i t t l e effect i f 
private cartels can shut off American markets to foreign producers or 
prevent American producers from selling abroad. 
The Good Neighbor Policy i s one of the fundamental principles of our 
relations with Latin America, While our government was bending every effort 
to bring about the conditions of sound and mutually advantageous cooperation, 
cartels were systematically undermining these efforts, Latin America was 
turned over by private cartels as a colony to hostile foreign interests. By 
giving German industry v i r t u a l l y a free hand i n Latin America, and by agree-
ing not to compete, American cartelists made possible the creation of a Ger-
man sphere of influence, Nazi propoganda, espionage, and subversive activity 
a l l stem directly from this unhampered German penetration. When South 
Americans sought to p\irchase drugs, metals, and munitions from the United 
States, private cartel treaties had already provided that Merican concerns 
coTild not engage i n this trade. Not only was the healthy development of 
South American trade and industry checked, but even today we are trying to 
overcome the bad taste i n the mouths of South Americans that these activities 
22 
of cartels have caused. 
22, J , Anton De Haas, Ibid, pg, 26 
We have long cherished the principle of open covenants openly arrived 
at. In fact, this policy i s an essential part of America's conduct of 
foreign a f f a i r s , Bveiy treaty commitment made by this country i s debated 
publicly by the people's representatives. Without the agreement of 2/3 of 
the Senate and the agreement of the President, no treaty can be made, yet 
agreements have been made i n international industry affecting both the 
American economy and our foreign policy which have been secretly contrived. 
The Americans have no vote but they bear the burden of these private treat-
ies. How seriously and how gravely o\ir foreign policy was undermined i s 
indicated by a few examples. 
In February of 191+1, when Britain was i n the most c r i t i c a l p e r i l , a 
cartel agreement decreed that a large American munitions manufacturer could 
not supply certain explosives to the B r i t i s h , This would have violated the 
commitment of the American cartelist to i t s German partner. 
In 1935, after Hitler had announced his intentions, England and France 
sought to obtain desperately needed military optical goods from this country, 
A cartel agreement decreed that England and France were territory to be sup-
plied by German interests and the sale was prohibited. 
Prior to the war, the shipment of v i t a l l y needed magnesium from th i s 
country to Great Britain was restricted by cartel agreements. Examples l i k e 
these could be multiplied indefinitely i f the facts were only known. 
Make no mistake - the war has not interfered with cartel plans. Cartel 
agreements invariably provide for the contingency of war. Long before the 
war cartels worked out a "modus vivendi" - a method of continued existence -
for they f e l t that their relations must be preserved, war or no war. Thus we 
find American and British cartelists agreeing to preserve the German position 
i n Latin Amertcan markets during the war. Agreements between the cartel 
maabers of co\mtries at war provided for the resumption of same at the close 
of h o s t i l i t i e s . In case legislation or government action interfere, then 
they w i l l cooperate to adapt their relations, as one agreement states, "in 
the s p i r i t of the present agreements". 
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Therefore, the necessity for vigorous action i n keeping open the 
channels of trade becomes apparent when we consider that those who create 
cartels hold themselves above the law or seek to control legislation and 
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government policy i n the many countries where they operate. 
An economic world dominated by cartels i s f e r t i l e ground for the 
seeds of international suspicion, distrust, and intrigue. The aggravation 
of international differences which might otherwise be overcome tends to i n -
crease when public policy of government i s annulled by the conduct of power-; 
f u l industrial groups acting secretly. 
There are today some voices advocating the rationalization of our 
economic relations with the rest of the world, either according to some 
system of cartels controlled by government or according to some plan for 
complete governmental direction of a l l foreign trade. Under either design 
for monopoly free enterprise could not survive. 
For the sake of our military security and for the sake of our economic 
welfare we cannot permit American firms to enter into agreements which divide 
the world market, which exclude opportunity for new enterprise, which expose 
the independent businessman to the threat of extermination and which lead 
ultimately to mass unemployment and depression. 
I t must be recognized that the concentration of economic power which 
developed prior to the war had once more been accelerated and extended under 
the pressure of war needs. Recently a sub-committee of the Senate Committee 
on Education and Labor reported that: 
Throughout the f i r s t two and one-half years of our 
effort, 100 of America's largest corporations have re-
ceived 75/0 of a l l war contracts by dollar volume. To 
them has gone the great bulk of new plants built at 
government expense, over |1U,000,000,000, Merica, a 
land of giant corporations before the war, w i l l emerge 
from this war with a larger share of i t s vastly expanded 
econony controlled by a smaller number of firms, ^ 
I t i s undoubtedly true that some further extension of the concentration 
of economic power for the purpose of e3q)editing and expanding war production 
23, Wendell Berge, What Shall We Do About Cartels i n the Postwar Period? pg, 5 
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was unavoidable. However that, may be, i t i s clear that i n the processes of 
reconverting American industry to peacetime production care and resourceful-
ness w i l l be needed to reverse this trend. Our program for reconversion must 
make a democratic competitive economy a daily reality. 
-2h-
IHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH CARTELS 
The problem of keeping a competitive econoniy i s among the most 
v i t a l concerns confronting business, labor, and government i n the 
postwar period. Businessmen, i n particular, must realize that i f the 
system of free private enterprise i s to survive, i t must prove equal 
to a momentous task. Another major depression i n this country, with 
attendant widespread insecurity, loss of world trade, and the lurking 
threat of international f r i c t i o n and war w i l l t o l l a l l the bells for 
the passing of the system of economic libersilism forever. 
Those who believe i n free enterprise understand that to meet this 
test effectively the role of business must be clearly and accurately 
assessed. In concrete terms, i t i s essential that industry assume a 
venturesome lead i n promoting peacetime economic activity. This means 
that industry must, by i t s i n i t i a t i v e , create new fields of production, 
new goods and services, new jobs and occupations. 
We know that the capacity to achieve these goals exists. Our poten-
t i a l productivity has been demonstrated. Our labor force w i l l be, i n con-
sequence of i t s training .in armed forces and industry alike, the most 
highly skilled urtiich we have ever had. Our industrial managers and our 
progressive group of businessmen have glimpsed new possibilities of markets, 
methods, and products diiring the war years, A whole new group of "dynamic 
capitalists" has come to the fore, not only revitalizing many old industries, 
but expressing determination to enter new fields and open up new lines of 
production. This group, including maiy recent arri v a l s , can count within 
i t s ranks a good many representatives of the old line industrial interests, 
who have come to realize that progressive, constructive change, a venture-
some viewpoint, and a willingness to enter into competition and promote a 
young industry benefit a l l sectors of the econony. 
In the United States the choice we make between economic philosophies 
may well decide the future of democracy. I f we extend governmental planning 
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to a l l branches of economic l i f e , or i f we permit private planning to 
freeze the pattern of industrial concentration and control, we shall 
svirrender the chance to attain economic democracy. Once economic free-
dom has been eliminated, there i s no turning back, and democracy i t s e l f 
becomes a shadow without substance. 
We stand on the threshold of some of the greater technical and 
scientific developments of modem history, light metals, vitamins, tele-
vision, new chemical and electrical techniques are a l l i n their infancy. 
Air transport, housing developments, and the improvement of national health 
w i l l provide an insistent demand for the output of these new materials. The 
slums of country and of city alike can become an unpleasant memory i f new 
materials for housing are made available i n a conqpetitive market. The most 
provincial area can possess the advantages of the great metropolis through 
radio, television, and electric power. 
This future w i l l not be won without effort. I f scientific development 
and economic progress i s nu l l i f i e d by a system of cartels and monopolies or 
by rigid government control, we shall delay and may lose the opportunities 
which w i l l be opened to us at the end of the war. I f discovery i s to be 
translated into a more abundant l i f e , the way to enterprise must be guarded 
as we guard ovir c i v i l l i b e r t i e s . 
What can be done to keep otxr economy from following twin mirages of 
"self governing" monopoly and government control of business? Considered 
as a question of policy and as a program, certain principles emerge from 
the confusion which surrounds oxir current economic thinking. I t seems to 
me that we should move i n the following directions: 
F i r s t , The present controls of government which have regimented and 
welded us into a wartijae econoniy must be ranoved as soon as possible after 
the peace. To delay beyond the period of necessity i s to invite their per-
petuation. 
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The American people are well aware of the danger represented by a 
cartelized economy in which monopolies and power hungry groups seek to 
control economic and p o l i t i c a l l i f e on a basis of privilege. The ex-
perience of Germany in recent years demonstrates a l l too clearly the 
vicious results of a union between cartels and paternalistic government. 
The keynote of a monopolized econony and a feudalistic p o l i t i c a l regime 
becomes suppression. No competition i s pennitted. Those who exercise 
their i n i t i a t i v e are considered bootleggers, chiselers, and f i n a l l y be-
came outlaws. Once ccanpetition i s eliminated, there i s only a short step 
to the suppression of free speech and the right to c r i t i c i z e , A society 
so constituted can endure only by a reign of forces. The Nazis achieved 
power l y terrorism and could maintain thonselves i n power only by military 
aggression. 
I t i s i n the postwar world that American capitalism, i n fact, democ-
racy i t s e l f , w i l l meet i t s most serious challenge. To win the war we had 
to give up temporarily many of our fundamental economic li b e r t i e s . I t i s 
also necessary that during this transitional period of getting back to 
peacetime production certain controls are needed. In general, i t seems that 
necessity continues only as long as there are v i t a l shortages and only i n 
the fields where shortage exists. When scarce materials cease to be scarce, 
there would seem, as a general rule, to be no further need for transitional 
controls. 
Second. The new technology developed by this war must be made available 
to peacetime industry, A free technology i s a key to progress. Inventions 
developed by public funds i n this war must not become the private preserves 
of monopoly groups. The results of this research must be made available to 
returning servicemen and to youth generally, so that free enterprise can be 
more than a pious hope to them. I f necessary, the government should develop 
i t s own industrial research f a c i l i t i e s , as i t has done so extensively and so 
f r u i t f u l l y for agriculttire, and make the results available to a l l , including 
small and large businessmen. 
Third. Plants constructed i n wartime must not be ploughed under i n 
peacetime. The large productive capacities which we have created must be 
utilized to advance our standard of living and maintain our national i n -
come. This w i l l be absolutely necessary i f we are to maintain a national 
income which can carry a national debt load of from two to three hundred b i i l i o n 
dollars, i f we are to find Jobs for the returning servicemen, and i f unenqjloy-
ment and sectional dislocation i s to'be avoided i n the transition from war to 
peace. The small businessmen must receive primary consideration in the dis-
position of government plans and surplus war materials. 
Fourth, Credit must be made available to small business. Small business 
unavoidably has fo\md the going rough d\iring this war. The postwar period w i l l 
find i t without the reserves available to larger units. Since small business 
i s in many respects the most v i t a l part of otir econony, we must see that credit 
i s made available to i t on liber a l terras. 
F i f t h , Taxation incentives should be given for the launching of new 
enterprises and for expansion of existing plants. Taxation must not dis-
courage venture capital and productive investment. We must recognize that 
a steady stream of new investment i s necessary to an expanding economy. 
Sixth, Internal trade barriers among the states and between sections 
must be removed. The discriminatoy freight rates which have burdened the 
South and the West and hampered their development must be eliminated, as 
must other restrictive transportation practices, and also certain state 
legislation which thwarts the policy of Congress i n fostering the freest 
passage of goods i n interstate commerce. 
Seventh, Intemational trade should be encouraged. The Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements policy of our government should be promoted. Tari f f 
barriers should be lowered or removed wherever possible. Cartels, which 
are, i n effect, privately erected t a r i f f barriers, are i l l e g a l , and must 
be completely abolished. World wide trade w i l l not only make people i n 
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every comer of the earth richer, but w i l l give the people everywhere a 
vested interest i n maintaining peace. 
Eighth. Patents must be made to promote the advance of science and 
the useful arts. We cannot tolerate the use of patents to block off and 
fmce i n whole sectors of our technology. At the same time patent pro-
tection must act as an incentive to the individual inventor and the bus-
inessman. The patent system should remain, but i t s abuses shoxild be up-
rooted. Research developed i n Germany for the purpose of making war on 
us should be made available for general use by the people of the United 
States, 
Ninth, Labor must have the right to collective bargaining. In i t s 
own interest i t should not attempt to prevent the development and intro-
duction of new inventions and techniques or to Join with industrial groups 
to f i x prices and production quotas. In the long run, labor i s the princi-
pal beneficiary of technological progress because as i t s productivity i n -
creases i t s standard of livi n g r i s e s . Social security and unemployment 
insurance programs, i f wisely conceived and administered, are not only con-
sistent with capitalism but w i l l promote and assist i t s successful f\mction-
ing. They should be encouraged. 
Tenth, The government should properly develop public works and projects 
of the TVA variety, not only as emergency measures, but to provide additional 
opportunities for free private enterprise. The TVA has opened up an entire 
region for industrial investment and development. Business ventures of every 
type are now flourishing i n that area. The continuation of the policy re-
presented by TVA and similar long-range public works projects offers con-
25 
structive support by government to private i n i t i a t i v e and f u l l employment. 
Finally, there should be vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws. 
I t i s equally to the interest of the business man, the worker, and the con-
sumer to see that these acts are applied, no matter what p o l i t i c a l party i s 
25, Wendell Berge, The Future of American Capitalism, pp. 10-12 
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i n power. This series of acts reflects the free enterprise s p i r i t of 
America, This support should be more than l i p service. In i t s own 
interests, business should i n s i s t on the enforcement of the antitrust 
laws, 
America now must face the struggle to create the free markets of 
industrial opportunity which has only been postponed during the war. 
Every problem which faced us i s again on our doorstep. Todsy we are, 
i n the most part, ignoring these problems. 
The American public seems to want the risk taken out of their economic 
l i v e s . Labor wants the government to guarantee jobs, and to see that a 
floor i s set for wages. Farmers want governmental control. They demand 
that the government keep up farm prices by subsidy i f necessary. 
The average American i s puzzled by this picture and so they want to be 
assured of old age pensions, unemployment r e l i e f and medical care supplied 
l y the government. But America can't build a dynamic and expending economy 
out of cushions against insecurity. Although we do have these security 
agencies, most of the Americans w i l l not be content with the minimum standard 
of liv i n g set by the government, no matter how high i t i s , l&idoubtedly, fur-
ther advancement w i l l be made incited by the fear of poverty and want. 
I t would seem that this desire for security i s a phase through which 
the American people seem to be passing. Maybe i t i s j+xst that the people 
fear that a depression w i l l follow this bocmi of wartime, but a controlled 
econony would be just what the cartels would l i k e . The American people do 
not want an econony dominated by cartels, 
Intemational cartels cannot operate within countries where monopolies 
cannot control the domestic market. The f i r s t attack should, therefore, be 
by national action within the United States, as well as within each of the 
other nations where cartels flo\irish. The following types of action are 
suggested i n America's Stake i n Britain's Future, 
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1. Devise better means of regulation. Regulation w i l l never be 
effective as long as i t must be dependent on specific legislation and 
actions i n courts. I t must be carried on adminigtratively and must be 
flexible enough to meet new conditions as they arise. The Federal 
Trade Commission was devised for this pvirpose but i t has not lived up 
to the hopes of i t s designers. Indeed, i t has virtually given up any 
attempt to solve the monopoly problem and has devoted i t s energies largely 
to preventing the "unfair competition" of misleading brands and labels. 
I t has been suggested that every business fengaged i n intemational 
trade - and perhaps those that are engaged i n interstate trade - be com-
pelled to incorporate federally. Federal corporate charters would, l y 
law, be granted only on certain general conditions drafted in the public 
interest and would be subject to renewal at stated periods. Such condi-
tions might embody the principle that the corporation would have no r i ^ t 
to engage i n any activity which would con5)romise the fullest production 
and employment pennitted by the current level of technology, the availa-
b i l i t y of materials, and the labor supply, A commission would be empowered 
to see that corporate practice lived up to these conditions i n detail, to . 
give f u l l publicity to corporate a f f a i r s , and possibly to withdraw the 
corporate charter, i f the corporation i n question was persistently and 
knowingly guilty of violations. 
I f litigation arose i n connection with this kind of regulation, the 
burden of proof woTild be on the corporation instead of on the government. 
The corporation would have to appeal to the courts to upset an administra-
tive action, rather than the government appealing to the courts to forbid 
a corporate action, 
2, Break the corporate monopoly on patents. Many of the important 
patents on which cartels now base their power are of German origin. Most 
of these have been seized by the government and are now i n the hands of the 
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Alien Property Custodian, Former Attorney General Biddle suggested that 
these patents should not be returned to the German owners, but be held 
for use i n the public interest. After the last war we did not return 
German patents but disposed of them to private conrpanies, some of whom 
secretly represented the German owners, and most of whom used them (as 
they assumed the right to do under the patent laws) for monopolistic 
gain, Mr, Biddle's suggestion i s a good one. We do not see how i t can 
be executed unless the government retains the patents and licenses them 
to a l l on equal terms. 
This, however, i s only a half measure, since i t does not bear on 
fut\ire patents, and ary concerns which do not hold the American patents 
that complement the German ones may hesitate to buck the great power of 
the existing monopolies. Some revision of the patent laws i s necessary 
which, i f possible, w i l l retain the incentive to inventors while pre-
venting use of patents to restrain trade or res t r i c t output. 
In addition, a suggestion of possibly great benefit i s to set up a 
public research organization with ample funds, dedicated to making i n -
ventions and improvements which may be ai^jloyed hy anybody. This would 
not forbid individual ingenuity and inventiveness, but i t would provide . 
a public competition for the great private research organizations from 
which many industrial in^jrovements now stem, and which permit monopolistic 
exploitation of the brains of scientists and technicians. 
3, Use the public power to compete. In numerous important i n -
dustries where monopoly practices prevail, the government has built for 
war purposes and now owns great productive f a c i l i t i e s . The corporations, 
many of which are operating these plants as contractors, are exercising 
strong influence to have the plants either closed down or sold out to 
' private interests as quickly as possible. They have been i n the main 
supported ty the Barauch report. As suggested by Harlow S, Person i n 
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the "New Republic", the government should retain whatever plants are neces-
sary for the purpose of ensuring f u l l employment and f a i r prices. Public 
competition has been effectual i n Sweden and has shown what i t can do i n the 
United States i n the TVA. The government need not operate a l l the plants i t 
owns; i t can rent theta to private contractors, but under such conditions that 
practices which are a detriment to the public shall not prevail, 
5. I n s t a l l democratic planning. Most iinportant of a l l , the government 
shovild not leave the planning function entirely to those who operate for 
private gain. I t should not be content with negative and regulatory measures, 
but should step i n to supervise the constructive job which monopolists say and 
may think they are doing i n rationalizing production, economizing resources, 
and stabilizing the economy. The main trouble with their activities i s not 
that they attempt these things but that they stabilize on a level of prices 
higher than the technical arts would permit, and on a level of output lower 
than our productive resotirces, including the labor supply, would j u s t i f y . 
The government need not do this job i n a bureaucratic or dictatorial 
fashion, but i t i s peculiarly f i t t e d to mobilize the common interest of 
business, labor, agriculture, and constimers i n f u l l production and avoidance 
of depression. I t can do this by calling together representatives of a l l the 
main interest groups, to supervise the preparation of a production program 
based on the needs of consumers and large enough to u t i l i z e our f u l l capacity. 
This program should be continually revised as demands change i n the r e t a i l 
markets and as productivity increases. The performance of industry i n meeting 
i t shoTild be checked, and measures sho+ild be taken wherever necessary to i n -
crease production. 
Such a program would be a guide for many of the' activities outlined. I t 
would, for instance, provide standards for the examdnation of the practices 
of federally incorporated companies, and i t would indicate how much governmental 
comrpetition i s desirable and i n what lines. I t wotild also be the criterion 
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of a compensatory f i s c a l policy on the part of the government, or for a 
public works program to stabilize the construction industry. 
In spite of any such measures which may be taken within individual 
nations, intemational cartels may persist and continue to exploit con-
s\aiiers, even within oountries which have themselves overcome the evils 
of monopoly, i f these countries are not large producers of the products 
controlled by the cartels. Thus, the Iftiited States i s dependent upon 
foreign sources for t i n , and could not, merely by domestic legislation, 
protect i t s e l f against the t i n cartel. Other nations are much less 
independent economically than we, 
6, Establish a Yforld Trade Board, There have been numerous sug-
gestions for an intemational agency to help stabilize world trade on 
an active basis and guarantee "freedom of access to raw materials". I f 
this i s to mean anything, i t must at least mean the ctirbing of inter-
26 
national monopolies. 
I f i t i s difficvat to abolish monopoly ty national legislation, i t 
w i l l be s t i l l more d i f f i c u l t to do so on an international scale, where 
there i s no government having sovereign powers, and there i s not li k e l y 
to be any for maiy years. By international agreement, however, we can 
create an agency which can investigate and give publicity to any combin-
ation which fixes prices or limits output, and by the same means we can, 
in many cases, provide representation for the individual consumers, or 
for consuming nations, i n such decisions. An agreement of this nature 
regarding coffee now exists between the IMited States and numerous 
Latin American countries. I f the world board should be convinced that 
no limitation was desirable for aiy particular products, or that the 
consumers were under-represented or flouted i n i t s decisions, i t could do 
much to stimulate new sources of supply. At any rate, i t would not leave 
cartel transactions i n the no man's land they now occupy, free to carry 
26, George Soxae, Ibid, pp. I8I-I86 
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on in almost complete privacy and immunity. 
An intemational trade board would have to maintain close relationships 
with other world-wide economic agencies, such as the Intemational Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the Intemational Food and Agriculture Organ-
ization, a i ^ machinery -sdiich i s established to stabilize exchanges, and the 
agencies having to do with labor and standards of l i v i n g . I t might even work 
out a method of planning multilateral trade which could help to safeguard 
intemational balances of payments better than the exclusive bilateralism 
that prevailed before the war and would at the same time encourage world-wide 
expansion of production and consumption. 
Monopoly i s the greatest threat to the survival of true capitalism. For 
this reason i t i s important to affirm that capitalism does not mean - i n factj 
i t rejects - the right of private monopoly to s t i f l e enterprise. Vested mon-
opoly interests must not bar the emergence of new businesses. I t i s not, i n 
fact, consistent with the maintenance of a capitalistic system for either 
government or private monopoly to prevent the development of new industries 
in order to protect the old. Nor w i l l our system work i f we permit combina-
tions to dominate the market, to f i x prices, or to res t r i c t production, 
Basing-point systems, restrictive patent pools, closed-market agreements, 
cartel agreements which cut off free trade among nations, t a r i f f s which 
cater to special privilege, feather-bedding rules by labor unions - a l l are 
anti-capitalistic devices. They represent the most serious threat to a free 
capitalistic economy. No other system for organizing production places such 
a premixm on f l e x i b i l i t y or provides such stimulus to the introduction of 
new ideas, new industries, new goods and services. No other system offers 
such incentives to efficiency or emphasizes so completely the concept of 
service to the public, * . 
The scope and magnitude of America's achievement i n war production i s 
an xmmistakable index of our capacity for growth. The tremendous energy and 
determination which inspired and made possible the fulfillment of our war 
needs are equally available for the tasks of peace. I t i s the joint prob-
lem of government, industry and labor to unleash the incentives and to 
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keep clearly i n mind the goals which w i l l maintain the levels of employ-
ment and production attained during war. There i s every reason to believe 
that this nation can surpass i n time of peace i t s accQn5)lishments under 
the pressure of grim necessity. 
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